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Concern about packing concentration has led to numerous requests for USDA to investigate the 
potential connection between packet concentration and depressed cattle prices. These calls for 
investigations and concerns about meatpacking concentration and impact on cattle prices are not 
new.1 The most recent concern raised by cattle producers about packer concentration was due to 
depressed fed cattle prices post-Holcomb fire and COVID-19 pandemic resulted in a USDA 
report and pending DOJ investigation.  
Some legislation has been enacted as a result of previous investigations; most notably the 
Packers and Stockyards Act in the early 1920s. The recently proposed legislation has largely 
focused on the potential connection between these market shocks and the level of negotiated 
trade that occurs. One overarching concern is that to achieve price discovery that is informative 
in the marketplace, a regional sufficient level of negotiated trade must occur. To help achieve 
these goals, three bills have been proposed: Senator Grassley’s “50-14” rule, Senator Fisher’s 
“Cattle Transparency” bill, and Congressman Johnson’s “PRICE” act. These primarily aim to 
increase the level of negotiated trade, and, in some cases, create a cattle contracts library similar 
to the one available in the hog industry.  
The industry has long been opposed to government regulation that could distort market signals. It 
responded to proposed legislation by advocating for the “Bid-the-Grid” program and more 
recently the “75% rule”. The “75% rule” is a voluntary framework that includes cattle feeder and 
packing plant triggers based on levels of negotiated trade and marketplace participation. The 
overarching objective is to increase the frequency and price transparency in all major cattle 
feeding regions.  
The framework functions off a series of triggers – four cattle feeding and four packer 
participation. The packer participation portion of the plan is still under development. The four 
cattle feeding areas are 1) Nebraska-Colorado, 2) Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico, 3) Kansas, and 
4) Iowa-Minnesota. A minor cattle feeding trigger occurs if less than 75% of the robust level of
negotiated trade occurs in less than 75% of the weeks in a given quarter. Three minor triggers
1 The first time the term the “Big Four” was used was in 1860s. Since then at least eight major investigations have 
been called for by cattle producers alleging that packing concentration negatively impacted cattle prices. Likewise, 
concerns about the farm to retail spread or present as early as in 1905. It is important to note that prior to 1960, 
packer concentration occurred at cattle harvest where carcasses were shipped to meat wholesalers to be broken down 
carcasses. Post 1960 packer concentration has occurred as packers began breaking down carcasses and selling boxes 
of beef. 
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equal a major trigger. A major trigger occurring in (a) two of four rolling quarters, (b) any two 
consecutive quarters, or (c) any two quarters in a calendar year, would prompt the industry to 
seek legislative action. This policy is likewise conditional on updates from literature and 
industry, and qualifying Black Swan events or ad hoc events that disrupt the normal cattle flows.  
 
The question is whether this policy meets the objective to increase the level of negotiated trade 
and cattle price transparency. In other words, if this policy were historically in place, how likely 
would have minor (major) triggers occurred? Using public data published weekly and available 
through USDA-AMS from 2013-2020, I analyze this policy by addressing eight underlying 
assumptions. I further demonstrate potential considerations that could impact the “efficiency” of 
this policy. 
 
1) Number of minor triggers required: The current policy states that three minor triggers 
constitute a major trigger. Details and data on the required packer participation portion are 
not yet available. Focusing only on the cattle feeding regions and minor triggers defined by 
the current 75% rule, no three regions have ever triggered in the same quarter. Two or more 
cattle feeding triggers have only occurred in six quarters, and one region triggering has 
occurred in 10 quarters. All two or more triggers only occur in the Kansas and Texas-
Oklahoma-New Mexico regions. There is at least one trigger in approximately 50% of 
quarters from 2013-2020. In other words, it is unlikely that a major trigger would occur due 
solely to cattle feeding negotiated cash levels.  
 
2) Nebraska-Colorado combination: Colorado and Nebraska are combined in the policy to 
form one region. The justification for this combination is not stated. Currently, USDA reports 
these as two separate regions and recent USDA-AMS discussions have recommended 
combining Colorado with Wyoming, not Nebraska. Two reasons for this combination are 
possible: 1) Western Nebraska and Colorado have similar climates and 2) issues with the lack 
of reporting in Colorado. Historically, Colorado has failed to meet USDA confidentiality 
requirements leading to nonreporting weeks. Combining Nebraska and Colorado reduces the 
number of minor triggers that would likely occur in a five region – three minor trigger 
scenario. Figure 1 plots the average percentage of weeks within a quarter failing to meet 
robust negotiated trade minimums under the four proposed regions plus Nebraska and 
Colorado. The horizontal dotted black line represents the proposed 75% minimum. Points 
above this line indicate the region failed to meet robust minimum requirements in that quarter 
and thus a minor trigger occurred. The NE-CO combination never triggers. Separating 
Colorado and Nebraska shows that Colorado frequently triggers while Nebraska never 
violates more than 30% of weeks. Clearly, combining Nebraska and Colorado reduces the 
potential number of minor triggers. 
 
3) 75% of reporting weeks: For a region to trigger, less than 75% of the robust negotiated 
trade must occur in more than 75% of the weeks in a quarter, or 10 out of 14 weeks. As the 
percent of weeks increases towards 100, the policy is less likely to trigger. On the other hand, 
as the percent of weeks required decreases towards 0, the policy is more likely to trigger. 
Table 1 illustrates this by fixing the percent of robust trade at 75% and varying the percent of 
weeks required to satisfy the 75% minimum and determine the percent of quarters activating 
a minor trigger by each of the four regions. Regardless of the required percent of weeks, 
there are levels in which Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico and Kansas regions will trigger. 
Iowa-Minnesota region would rarely, if ever, trigger, and the Nebraska-Colorado region only 
begins triggering around 50%.  
 
4) 75% of robust negotiated trade: For a region to trigger, less than 75% of the robust 
negotiated trade must occur in more than 75% of the weeks in a quarter, or 10 out of 14 
weeks. How one defines these robust levels of negotiated trade is likely to be debated. 
Current robust levels are taken from the Price Discovery Research Project (2017). As the 
percent of robust trade required each week goes towards 100, more regions will trigger. On 
the other hand, as the required percent of robust trade decreases towards 0, fewer regions will 
trigger. Table 2 illustrates this by fixing the percent of weeks at 75% and varying the percent 
of robust trade required in each week by region and determine the percent of quarters 
activating a minor trigger by each of the four regions. Under the most stringent policy (i.e. 
robust trade = 100%) Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico will trigger in approximately 75%, 
Kansas 50%, Nebraska-Colorado 10%, and Iowa-Minnesota 0% of quarters. If the policy 
aims to increase the level of negotiated trade, increasing the required level of robust trade 
each week will meet this objective but to a slower and lesser extent than changing the 
required number of weeks (see point 3 above), all else held equal.  
 
5) Policy evaluation choice: Whether a major trigger is likely to occur is largely dependent on 
the combination of the level of robust trade required in each week and the percent of weeks 
required to meet this minimum. The policy defines three minor triggers equal a major trigger. 
For the industry to seek legislative action, a major trigger must occur in (a) two of four 
rolling quarters, (b) any two consecutive quarters, or (c) any two quarters in a calendar year. 
Which of these three criteria to use in the official policy is currently being debated. As 
mentioned in point 1 above, it is historically unlikely that three cattle feedings regions would 
trigger at the same time. Thus, I show that the performance of these three criteria varies by 
the percent of required robust trade, percent of weeks required to meet this minimum, and 
varying levels of minor triggers required to equal a major trigger. Figure 2 plots the average 
number of violations within a quarter by these variations. The black dotted vertical line 
represents the current 75% rule robust negotiated trade minimum proposed in the policy. The 
panel combination “PCT.OF.WEEKS: 75 & MINOR.TRIGGERS: 3” is the performance of 
the current proposed “75% rule”. Under the current policy, historically, a major trigger would 
not have been triggered due to only cattle feeding participation. The criteria of “2 of 4 rolling 
quarters” and “Any 2 quarters in a calendar year” have similar levels of regional triggers 
regardless of the percent of robust trade or percent of weeks, both of which, are higher than 
“Any 2 consecutive quarters”. At higher levels of required robust trade, all policy criteria 
increase. At lower amounts of weeks required to meet minimum policy, triggers increase. 
Figure 2 can be used to explore a variety of potential scenarios involving changes to the 
percent of robust trade and percent of weeks violating minimums and how these choices 
subsequently affect policy triggers. On average, policy criteria largely perform the same.  
 
6) Nominal vs. percent of trade: The current policy requires regions to meet the nominal level 
of trade rather than a percent of total transactions (negotiated cash + negotiated grid + 
formula + forward contract). In stable market circumstances, the difference between nominal 
values and percentage is negligible. If cattle slaughter increases over time, then negotiated 
cash as a percentage of total transactions would decrease and the policy would be less 
binding. On the other hand, if cattle slaughter decreases over time, then negotiated cash as a 
percentage of total transactions would increase and the policy would be more binding. 
Current conversations about the appropriate level of negotiated sales have predominately 
centered on the percentage or share of transactions, not on the nominal level. For example, 
the percent of steers and heifers sold via negotiated cash has decreased from about 30% in 
2016 to 20% in 2020. Likewise, commercial cattle slaughter has been increasing since 2014 
and there is debate on whether carcass weights should continue to rise any further. Given 
these circumstances, and as the United States seeks to increase beef exports, cattle slaughter 
is likely to continue to rise, making this issue more important. A comparable parallel would 
be the hog industry, which has increased hog slaughter to meet increasing export demands, 
but the percent of hogs sold via negotiated trade has decreased – to approximately 5% of all 
transactions.  
 
7) Negotiated sales = negotiated cash + negotiated grid: The policy states that negotiated 
sales consist of negotiated cash + negotiate grid. Historically negotiated grid is infrequently 
used, and if used it is more common in regions where there are high amounts of formula and 
forward contract sales. Defining negotiated sales as negotiated cash plus negotiated grid 
makes regions less likely to trigger since there are fewer cattle qualifying as negotiated sales. 
The debate would likely center around whether negotiating grid sales provides the same type 
of information as negotiated cash sales. Regions that already have a large number of 
negotiated cash transactions are likely to be less affected by this change in definition than 
other regions that have historically struggled to meet robust negotiated trade minimums.   
 
8) Adjustments due to Black Swan events and ad hoc regional cattle disruptions: The 
policy currently has a qualifying statement that allows for adjustments to the required robust 
levels of negotiated trade and weeks satisfying the robust minimum given Black Swan events 
and ad hoc regional cattle disruptions. Both the Holcomb Fire and COVID-19 pandemic 
would fit under this category. If required robust trade was reduced and weeks increased 
during these events then regions would likely not trigger. However, given these potential ad 
hoc adjustments would this policy helped stabilize negotiated trade during the recent 
Holcomb Fire and COVID-19 pandemic? If not, then the current market situations which 
spurred these industry policy changes would not have been improved by the prior 
implementation of this policy.  
 
The industry’s “75% rule” was developed in response to proposed legislation to solve potential 
concerns about thinness in negotiated trade across different regions. The current concern 
surrounding thinness in negotiated trade has more to do with lower cash prices received by 
producers due to the Holcomb Fire and COVID-19 pandemic. Changes to the federal law or 
industry policy would not have effectively raised producer prices received for cattle. Further, if 
this policy would have been implemented before either the Holcomb Fire or COVID-19 it would 
not have changed packing plants’ ability to process cattle (supply from feedlots) or lack of 
foodservice’s demand for beef. Figure 1 shows that only the Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico 
region tripped during those events.  
 
This policy, in its current form and from the four cattle feeding regions perspective, is not likely 
to significantly improve the level of negotiated trade nor cattle market transparency. Since it 
does not change the supply of fed cattle nor the demand for wholesale beef, it is also not likely to 
increase the cash price received by producers. Anytime a policy is implemented, whether 
industry prompted or legislatively enacted, there is a potential for creating increased costs and 
reducing profitability for the entire beef complex. For example, to advert potential legislation, 
packers and feedlots could change cattle marketing behavior from profit-maximizing to negative 
policy aversion creating inefficiencies in the beef complex. Consistent with the economic theory 
of derived demand, these additional costs, spurred on by potential policies, are likely to 
predominately be carried by the cow-calf industry.  
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Table 1. Percent of quarters triggering by region given 75% of robust negotiated trade 
(cash + grid) and varying the percent of weeks below the threshold required to activate a 
minor trigger. 
Percent of 
Robust Trade 
Percent of 
Weeks 
Percent of Quarters Violating Policy 
NE-CO TX-OK-NM KS IA-MN 
75 5 57.14 94.29 91.43 45.71 
75 25 14.29 82.86 48.57 - 
75 50 2.86 60.00 31.43 - 
75 75 - 40.00 20.00 - 
75 95 - 17.14 5.71 - 
75 100 - 17.14 5.71 - 
Note: The grayed area is the current levels proposed under the “75% rule”.  
 
Table 2. Percent of quarters triggering by region given 75% of weeks below the threshold 
required to activate a minor trigger and varying the level of robust negotiated trade (cash + 
grid) required in each week. 
Percent of 
Robust Trade 
Percent of 
Weeks 
Percent of Quarters Violating Policy 
NE-CO TX-OK-NM KS IA-MN 
5 75 - - - - 
25 75 - 5.71 - - 
50 75 - 14.29 5.71 - 
75 75 - 40.00 20.00 - 
95 75 5.71 62.86 34.29 - 
100 75 8.57 74.29 45.71 - 
Note: The grayed area is the current levels proposed under the “75% rule”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
